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The Sword of Damocles: 
Revisiting the Question of Whether the United Nations 




This Article considers whether the United Nations Security Council is bound by 
international humanitarian law in the context of Chapter VII, which authorizes the Council 
to use force in response to aggression, threats to peace, and breaches of the peace. In the early 
1990s, the Council took unprecedented measures that were seen by many as overreaching, 
raising the possibility that the leading institution of global governance might abuse its power. 
At the present moment, it seems that the matter is resolved politically and judicially. But it is 
not resolved constitutionally, and the abuse of power by the Security Council remains a 
possibility. If, in the future, a permanent member of the Council comes to hold considerable 
political and economic influence over the other permanent members, as was the case in the early 
1990s, the possibility of an extraordinary abuse of power within the Security Council again 
becomes viable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the activism of the United 
Nations Security Council. It was an extraordinary moment in the history of the 
Council, as the paralysis that had characterized it throughout the Cold War had 
ended. For the first time since its inception, it was possible for the Council to act 
assertively and consensually, particularly in the context of Chapter VII, which 
authorizes the Council to respond to aggression, breaches of the peace, and 
threats to the peace. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its 
replacement by Russia, there was no counterweight on the Council to the US 
and its allies. At the same time, a type of overreaching that had been anticipated 
at the formation of the United Nations, but had never before come close to 
actualization, became possible. Now, for the first time in human history, there 
was an institution of global governance that, in Chapter VII, had a mandate 
whose boundaries were uncertain, whose will would be implemented by virtually 
every nation on earth, and whose machinery could now be put in motion. 
Starting in 1990, a number of the Council’s activities raised serious 
questions about whether its acts exceeded the scope of its mandate: if the United 
Nations Charter gave the Council such extensive powers “in order to ensure 
prompt and effective action,”1
                                                 
1  UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 1.  
 how do we make sense of the fact that this body 
invoked Chapter VII to create tribunals, which have continued for years after 
the crisis passed? What do we make of a situation where the Council punished a 
nation despite the fact that the nation was complying fully with its obligations 
under international law? How are we to make sense of a set of measures 
imposed by the Council in the name of stopping aggression and human rights 
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violations, measures which themselves brought about the widespread suffering 
of an entire civilian population? 
In response to the Council’s activism of the early 1990s, a critical question 
was articulated again and again: is the Security Council bound by law, exempt 
from law, or is it the ultimate arbiter of its own legality? This question was raised 
at the inception of the United Nations, was rarely of interest for the next forty 
years, and then became of matter of profound concern and urgency for a 
decade.2 It seems now that the question is comfortably resolved. While 
international judicial bodies do not have direct judicial review, they have 
nevertheless spoken to the issue on several occasions and have been increasingly 
explicit in maintaining that the Council is bound by international law.3 Likewise, 
current legal scholarship consistently recognizes a broad consensus regarding the 
particular principles of law that are binding on the Council. Politically, within the 
Council, there is no longer the unchallenged hegemony that characterized the 
early 1990s; consequently, the kind of overreaching that triggered concerns 
within the international community is no longer possible.4
But it has not been resolved. It is not a matter controlled by legal 
scholarship, judicial dictum, or the politics of the moment. The question is a 
constitutional one, and it is as relevant now as it was in 1990, when every 
country in the world was obliged to participate in denying Iraq access to basic 
necessities, including food and potable water, until that strangulation brought 
about the deaths of infants and young children, as well as the collapse of every 
major system necessary to support human life.
 It would thus seem 
that the matter has been largely settled. 
5
                                                 
2  See Section II. 
 It is fully conceivable that there 
may arise another historical moment in which one of the permanent members of 
the Council holds such extraordinary political and economic sway that none of 
the other permanent members are in a position to oppose its will. At the same 
time, the notions of aggression, breaches of the peace, and threats to the 
peace—the core of Chapter VII—lend themselves to interpretation of 
extraordinary breadth, arguably including anything from domestic civil rights 
violations to global climate change. However, as the venue for that 
argumentation, the Security Council is critically limited, its objectivity utterly 
precarious, and its judgment easily distorted by political machinations. At the 
same time, the stakes are high; at its extreme, the question is whether the 
Security Council, in the name of stopping aggression, can itself commit 
genocide. When we add to this the provision that every member state must 
3  See Section IV.C. 
4  See Section IV.A.2. 
5  See Section III.A.2. 
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implement measures imposed by the Council in accordance with Chapter VII6 
and that a state’s obligations under the Charter override any other international 
treaty obligations,7
In this Article, I revisit the question of whether the Security Council is 
bound by law. In contrast to previous approaches, this Article does so by 
looking at the history of the question: who anticipated it; who dismissed it; when 
the question was irrelevant; when the question was a matter of life and death; 
why the question is still a live one long after it seems to have been resolved in a 
smooth and tidy fashion; and why it is an enduring constitutional concern. If the 
Council in fact is not restrained by international law—or is not restrained 
sufficiently and clearly—then, like the sword of Damocles, an abuse of power by 
this institution hangs in the air as a continuing possibility. 
 we find ourselves looking at the possibility of an atrocity of a 
magnitude that simply staggers the imagination. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION  
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council 
to address aggression, breaches of the peace, and threats to the peace. It 
provides that the Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and that the Council will also 
decide what measures to take, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, “to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”8
Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
 Articles 41 and 42 provide 
that the Council’s actions under Chapter VII “may include” an array of 
measures: 
Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for 
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may 
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.9
It is striking that Chapter VII contains no explicit limits on the Council’s 
Chapter VII powers. However, there are arguably other provisions of the 
 
                                                 
6  UN Charter Art 25.  
7  Id at Art 103. 
8  Id at Art 39.  
9  Id at Arts 41, 42. 
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Charter that do. Most significantly, Article 24(2) provides that “[i]n discharging 
these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.”10
This did not escape notice when the United Nations was established at the 
San Francisco Convention in 1948, nor in the preparatory documents. In the 
1945 conference that formulated the United Nations Charter, the Conference on 
International Organisation, a number of delegations proposed amendments that 
would more explicitly articulate the Council’s limits and obligations.
 However, these “Purposes and Principles” 
are general statements that do not contain any clear limits on the Security 
Council. 
11 Others 
were concerned that the Council would function as the overriding source of law 
in Chapter VII situations, such that it would be exempt from other forms of 
international law.12 Many of the smaller nations pressed for more limits on the 
Council. These proposals were consistently rejected by the Great Powers that 
were to become the permanent members of the Council. For instance, Article 1 
provided that peaceful settlement of disputes would be “in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law.” The Norwegian delegate proposed an 
amendment to include the same language in regard to the use of force, stating 
that “no solution should be imposed upon a State of a nature to impair its 
confidence in its future security or welfare.”13 Mexico also wanted the language 
included. However, the UK and US delegates argued that this was unnecessary 
in light of the reference to justice and international law in the principles of the 
Charter.14
                                                 
10  UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 2. 
 The Ukrainian delegate maintained that the language concerning 
justice and international law had already been accepted by the committee, and 
11  Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control 
of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 Intl & Comp L Q 309, 315 (1997), citing 
Doc 881 III/3 146, 12 UNCIO Docs 504–5 (1945). 
12  Mohammed Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of Its Acts 1 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1994). Bedjaoui states that: 
the idea that the Security Council creates and imposes its own law raises [the 
question of] whether the Security Council, when operating in ‘lawmaker 
mode’, is exempted from the requirement to respect, on the one hand, the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter and, on the other, the rules and 
principles of international law. There is nothing new about these vital 
questions. They were raised at a theoretical level at the San Francisco 
Conference. 
 Id. 
13  Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 319 (cited in note 11), citing Doc 555 III/1/27, 11 UNCIO 
Docs 378 (1945). 
14  Id. 
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the US delegate maintained that this was an adequate response to Mexico’s 
concern.15
Additionally, no form of judicial review was acceptable to the Great 
Powers. Belgium proposed that disputes over interpretation of the Charter 
should be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but the proposal 
was rejected.
 
16 At the San Francisco Conference in 1948, the crucial decision was 
made not to set up a specific mechanism for interpreting the Charter; instead, 
each organ of the United Nations would interpret the provisions relevant to its 
work.17
This is a particular concern in light of Articles 25 and 103. Article 25 
establishes a mechanism of global enforcement with enormous reach: every 
member state of the United Nations is required to participate in the 
implementation of Chapter VII measures.
 Consequently, the Security Council would judge for itself whether its 
acts were authorized by the Charter. 
18 Article 103 is equally significant: “In 
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.”19
Does Chapter VII provide a blank check for the Council to do however it 
sees fit? Certainly the Security Council is not bound by international law in the 
same way that a state is. A state is only permitted to use force in self-defense,
 Consequently, a member state is required to implement Chapter VII 
measures, even if this requires the state to violate its other treaty obligations. 
Thus, there is good cause to ask not only whether the Charter created 
unprecedented machinery for coordinating global use of force, but also whether 
this machinery did not at the same time establish unprecedented possibilities for 
the abuse of power. 
20 
whereas the Council is permitted to intervene militarily in a broader range of 
circumstances.21 While Article 2 of the Charter affirms the sovereignty of all 
member nations without providing for any exceptions,22
                                                 
15  Id at 320. 
 a military intervention 
16  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 9–10 (cited in note 12). 
17  Id at 10.  
18  UN Charter Art 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).  
19  Id at Art 103.  
20  Id at Art 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”). 
21 Id at Arts 39–51. 
22  UN Charter Art 2, ¶ 1. 
The Sword of Damocles Gordon 
Winter 2012 611 
under Chapter VII clearly violates the territorial integrity of a state. Collective 
sanctions in general “cannot but override other principles and rules of 
international law such as non-interference in internal affairs, sovereignty . . . and 
freedom of trade and navigation.”23
Still, the Charter includes language that may provide some limitations on 
the Security Council’s powers. This occurs primarily in Article 24(2), in 
conjunction with Article 1. Article 24(2) provides that “[i]n discharging these 
duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.”
 
24
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace.
 Under Article 1, among the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations are: 
25
While Articles 25 and 103 do not contain explicit boundaries, it could be 
said that limits can also be inferred from their language. Article 25 provides that 
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
 
26 Similarly, 
Article 103 states that the members’ “obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.”27 These clauses could arguably be taken to mean that the member states 
are obligated to carry out only those acts of the Security Council that are in 
accordance with the Charter, implying that it is possible for Security Council 
measures to be ultra vires or otherwise in violation of the Charter. This view is 
contained in an early ICJ case, which held that “[t]he political character of an 
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established 
by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its 
judgment.”28
After the Charter was adopted, there were occasions on which legal 
scholars or international bodies maintained in broad terms that the United 
 
                                                 
23  Nico Schrijver, The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law 
Perspective, in Harry H.G. Post, ed, International Economic Law and Armed Conflict 123, 124 (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1994). 
24  UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 2. 
25  Id at Art 1.  
26  Id at Art 25 (emphasis added). 
27  Id at Art 103 (emphasis added). 
28  Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion, 1948 ICJ 57, 64 (May 28, 1948). 
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Nations and its organs were rooted in international law. For example, in 1949 a 
draft declaration of the International Law Commission stated that “[w]hereas a 
primary purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace 
and security, . . . the reign of law and justice is essential to the realization of that 
purpose.”29
The Security Council is not a body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a 
law unto itself. If it considers any situation as a threat to the peace, it may 
decide what measures shall be taken. No principles of law are laid down to 
guide it; it can decide in accordance with what it thinks is expedient.
 However, in none of these sources is it clear exactly where the 
boundaries of the Council’s mandate lie, much less what body would judge or 
enforce those boundaries. Indeed, shortly after the founding of the United 
Nations, some maintained that the Security Council was a source of law, not 
itself subject to the law, or was in some other way exempt. In 1950, John Foster 
Dulles maintained: 
30
The following year, the eminent jurist Hans Kelsen similarly held that “[t]he 
purpose of the enforcement action under Article 39 is not: to maintain or restore 




Among legal scholars, the issue of limitations on institutions of global 
governance, in particular the possibility of judicial review, was revisited time and 
again in the decades that followed the establishment of the United Nations, with 
varied results. In 1950, the Grotius Society conducted a study, The Problem of 
Redress Against the Decisions of International Organisations. Their rapporteur, André 
Gros, found that “[t]here is a crying need for judicial redress. States should be 
able to protect their rights by obtaining the annulment by an impartial tribunal 
of any decision of an organization which is ultra vires or represents an abuse of 
power.”
 
32 However, the Grotius Society refused to endorse these findings, on 
the grounds that the political organs of international bodies could be paralyzed 
by such an arrangement and that international judicial bodies could be 
overwhelmed with complaints.33
In 1952, at the Sienna Session of the Institut de Droit International, one 
commentator noted that most members were in favor of some form of judicial 
 
                                                 
29  Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle 
of Legality 16 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006), citing International Law Commission, Draft Declaration on 
Rights and Duties of States, UN Doc A/CN.4/2, preamble (Dec 15, 1948). 
30  John Foster Dulles, War or Peace 194–95 (MacMillan 1950). 
31  Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 294 
(Fredrick A. Praeger 1st ed 1950). 
32  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 58 (cited in note 12), paraphrasing André Gros, et al, The Problem of 
Redress Against the Decisions of International Organisations, 36 Transacts Grotius Socy 30, 30–31 (1950). 
33  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 57–58 (cited in note 12). 
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review for international political bodies.34 However, the British legal scholar 
Wilfred Jenks argued persuasively that it was too soon in the United Nation’s 
history to have any real concerns about the need for judicial review and that the 
risk of frivolous complaints would restrict governance bodies from taking 
effective action.35 The Institut concluded its deliberations with the modest 
suggestion that the possibility of judicial review should remain open.36 At the 
Amsterdam Session in 1957, the Institut revisited the question, finding that the 
possibility of judicial review depended on the particular structure of each 
organization: “[I]t is only via conventional provisions or other instruments 
specific to each organ or organization that, as matters stand at present, it seems 
practicable to lay down rules to cover such review, the remedies it implies and the 
effects it would have.”37
Outside the scholarly community, the issue received little attention. 
However, there were a handful of occasions on which international bodies 
addressed the question of the limits of the Council’s powers in some form. In 
1962, the United Nations General Assembly requested an advisory opinion 
regarding the costs of two United Nations operations: one established by the 
General Assembly in the Mideast and the other put in place by the Security 
Council in the Congo. The General Assembly requested guidance as to whether 
these could be considered “expenses of the Organization,” which under Article 
17 could then be charged to the member states.
 Thus, among scholars of international law in the decade 
following the United Nation’s inception, while there were occasional concerns 
about the possibility of abuses of power by organizations of global governance, 
these concerns tended to be overridden by a hesitation to impose measures that 
would burden the international judiciary or restrain the ability of the 
organizations to take effective action. 
38 The ICJ noted that when an 
organ of the United Nations is acting to achieve one of the purposes stated in 
the Charter, such as when the Security Council is taking action toward “the goal 
of international peace and security . . . the presumption is that such action is not 
ultra vires the Organization.”39
                                                 
34 Id at 58. 
 Thus, while the ICJ recognized the possibility that 
the Council could act outside the scope of its authority, at the same time it 
35 Id at 58–59. 
36 Id at 58–60. 
37  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 60 (cited in note 12), citing Institut de Droit International, 47 
Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 275 (1957). 
38  Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 
ICJ 151, 152 (July 20, 1962). 
39  Id at 168. 
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found that there is a presumption of validity when the Council acts pursuant to 
Chapter VII. 
In an advisory opinion concerning South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice maintained that the Security Council 
cannot abrogate or alter territorial rights, even when it is acting under Chapter 
VII. He noted: “This is a principle of international law that is as well-established 
as any there can be, and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the 
United Nations is itself a subject of international law) as any of its individual 
member States are.”40 The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
reiterated the “paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in 
the promotion of the rule of law among nations,”41 and the 1971 Zagreb 
resolution of the Institut de Droit International provided that United Nations 
forces engaged in peacekeeping were subject to the laws of war.42
Thus, in the four decades following the creation of the United Nations, 
there were occasionally international legal scholars and judicial opinions from 
the ICJ that maintained that the Security Council should be subject to the 
limitations of general principles of international law or to judicial review. 
However, those opinions primarily took place in the context of theoretical 
discussions of international law, expressed minority views, or both. 
 
But if there was little attention paid to the issue by scholars and 
international judicial bodies, it was also the case that there were few occasions 
on which to test this issue. While there had been resistance to mechanisms of 
accountability, particularly judicial review, the Security Council itself did not say 
explicitly, for example, that it was entitled to engage in genocide or human rights 
violations. One scholar noted that “members of the Security Council have never 
rejected the claim that international law applies to their conduct.”43 Indeed, 
member states often invoke international law in their argumentation before the 
Security Council.44
                                                 
40  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16, 300 (June 21, 1970) 
(Fitzmaurice dissenting). 
 Security Council resolutions often contain explicit reference 
41  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Res No 2625 (XXV), UN Doc 
A/RES/2625 (XXV), preamble (1970). 
42  Institut de Droit International, Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to 
Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged, Zagreb Sess Res (1971), online at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1971_zag_03_en.pdf (visited Sept 25, 2011). 
43  Mary Ellen O’Connell, The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing the 
Council Through Law Reform, in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, eds, The Security Council and the Use 
of Force: Theory and Reality—A Need for Change? 47, 57 (Martinus Nijhoff 2005). 
44  Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, in David M. Malone, ed, The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 591, 593 (Lynn Rienner 2004). 
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to principles of international law, including human rights. For example, 
Resolution 666, adopted in September 1990, shortly after sanctions were 
imposed on Iraq, requests that the Secretary-General obtain information on the 
availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait and instructs him to pay particular 
attention to the “categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as 
children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and 
the elderly.”45
Prior to 1990, there also were not any actions or policies on the part of the 
Security Council that implicated this question in a serious way. Because of the 
broader paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War, there were few 
resolutions passed at all, much less Chapter VII actions. The end of the Cold 
War changed that. While there were only twenty Security Council resolutions in 
1989, this number increased to thirty-seven in 1990, forty-two in 1991, seventy-
four in 1992, and ninety-three in 1993.
 Because the formal language of United Nations resolutions has 
not explicitly rejected international law, there have been no documents or public 
statements that themselves provided an occasion to confront the question of 
whether the Council is bound in its practices and policies to abide by 
international law. 
46 Chapter VII resolutions went from zero 
or one per year to fifteen to twenty per year.47
Some described this resurgence of Council activity in glowing terms, as 
signaling new possibilities for the effectiveness of institutions of global 
governance. Referring to the consensus that emerged in response to Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, one commentator noted:  
 
To many hopeful observers, this successful combination of American 
military capacity and Security Council legal authority represented a long-
delayed realization of the founding vision of a world order that married 
power and legitimacy. . . . This was beginning to look like the sort of UN 
promised at San Francisco.48
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that the US could exercise 
hegemony within the Council in a way that had never been possible before; the 
US was in a position to insert its interests and agenda into what was now an 
extraordinarily powerful vehicle of global governance. One scholar expressed 
concern that the Security Council might exercise its extraordinary powers in a 
manner that was arbitrary and highly politicized: 
  
There is a lack of consistency in practice, a failure to articulate principled 
lines of distinction identifying when a UN response is appropriate, and a 
                                                 
45  Security Council Res No 666, UN Doc S/RES/666, ¶¶ 3–4 (1990). 
46  Manusama, United Nations Security Council at 2 n 9 (cited in note 29). 
47  Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise 8 (Rutledge 2006). 
48  Id at 52. 
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reliance on unrestricted mandates to coalitions of States led by the United 
States. The Security Council is perceived as a geopolitical instrument, one 
that is currently dominated by the United States . . . .49
Thus, the concern of overreaching by the permanent members of the 
Council was anticipated from the inception of the United Nations and on many 
occasions thereafter; however, until the end of the Cold War, this concern was 
overridden by the view that the Council should not be constrained when facing 
emergency situations. 
  
III. THE ISSUE OF OVERREACHING 
A. Lockerbie, Iraq,  and Bosnia 
In the early 1990s, there were a number of occasions that directly invited 
the question of the abuse of power within the Security Council.  These include 
the Lockerbie incident; the sanctions on Iraq; and the arms embargo imposed on 
Bosnia. 
1. The Lockerbie case. 
In 1988, terrorists detonated a bomb on an airliner while it was passing 
over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two-hundred seventy people were killed. Two of 
those sought for prosecution were Libyan nationals. The US and UK demanded 
that Libya extradite them, although neither country had an extradition treaty 
with Libya.50 Libya initiated a criminal investigation against the suspects, asking 
the US and UK to provide any evidence they had in order to pursue a 
prosecution.51 The US and UK refused to do so, insisting instead that Libya 
extradite the suspects. Libya declined.52
The 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation
 
53 provides that in such cases a state must 
either extradite suspects for trial or try the suspects itself.54
                                                 
49  Richard A. Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, in Saul H. Mendlovitz and Burns H. 
Weston, eds, Preferred Futures for the United Nations 301, 318 (Transnational 1995). 
 Although Libya had 
complied with its treaty obligations by initiating criminal prosecution of the 
suspects, the Security Council demanded that Libya comply with the extradition 
50  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie (Libya v US), Application Instituting Proceedings (AIP), 1998 ICJ 115, § II.i (Mar 3, 
1992) (Libya v US AIP).  
51  Id. 
52 Id. 
53  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UN 
Treaty Ser 178 (1971). 
54 Id at Arts 5(2), 5(3), 8. 
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demands of the US and UK (as well as France) for the alleged role of the two 
men in the bombing.  
When Libya refused, the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII, 
sanctioned Libya, imposing an embargo on arms, aviation, and imports for 
petroleum production.55 Libya then brought a set of actions against the US and 
the UK before the ICJ, in which Libya argued that it was in full compliance with 
the Montreal Convention; that Article 7 of the Convention entitled Libya to 
prosecute its own nationals, especially in the absence of extradition treaties with 
the US or UK; and that the Council had no legitimate grounds to impose 
sanctions.56 The ICJ ruled against Libya on the grounds that, under Article 103 
of the Charter, a Security Council resolution overrides other international 
agreements, including the Montreal Convention.57
 The case raised concerns within the international community about the 
Council’s interpretation of its powers and the extremes to which it would go to 
enforce a questionable interpretation. If the Council could invoke Chapter VII 
to impose sanctions when Libya was in full compliance with international law, 
then it seemed the Council was free to make a determination that any state had 
committed a breach or threat to peace, even if it had not violated international 
law in any regard. 
 
The case also raised the question of the scope and limits of the Council’s 
power. In a separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen asked: 
[W]hether a decision of the Security Council may override the legal rights of 
States, and, if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the 
Council to characterize a situation as one [warranting this consequence]. Are 
there any limits to the Council’s powers of appreciation? . . . If there are any 
limits, what are those limits, and what body, if other than the Security 
Council, is competent to say what those limits are?58
In his dissent, Judge Weeramantry used stronger language, maintaining that 
“[t]he history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the view that a 
clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers is that those 




                                                 
55 Security Council Res No 748, UN Doc S/RES/748 (1992); Security Council Res No 883, UN 
Doc S/RES/883 (1993).  
 A number of scholars reacted to the Council’s measures 
against Libya and to the ICJ ruling by asking whether the Council is bound by 
56  Lockerbie, 1998 ICJ 115, § II.iii. 
57  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie (Libya v US), Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ 114, ¶ 42 (Apr 14, 1992). 
58 Id at ¶ 142 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeenin). 
59  Id at ¶ 175 (Weeramantry dissenting). 
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law, and if so, who would judge which laws were binding and whether the 
Council was or was not in compliance.60
The case illustrated the degree to which the Security Council was 
susceptible of being driven by the unilateral interests of its permanent members: 
without a counterweight, the US and UK were able to employ the machinery of 
global governance to pursue their national interests in prosecuting the Libyan 
suspects, regardless of the legality of the measure. 
 
2. The humanitarian impact of the Iraq sanctions. 
In August 1990, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security 
Council imposed on Iraq the most comprehensive sanctions in the history of 
global governance, prohibiting all exports and all imports, except medicine and, 
conditionally, food.61 For eight months, Iraq was not even allowed to import 
food.62 The combined humanitarian impact of the sanctions and the bombing 
campaign of the 1991 Persian Gulf War was immediate and severe. With the 
sanctions in place, it was not possible for Iraq to rehabilitate its infrastructure 
after the bombing, and a humanitarian crisis continued. In particular, the allied 
bombing destroyed electric generating plants, water purification systems, and 
sewage treatment facilities. The sanctions prevented them from being repaired 
or rebuilt. This lack of infrastructure resulted in ongoing epidemics of cholera 
and typhoid. In 1990 the incidence of typhoid was 11.3 per 100,000 people; by 
1994 it was more than 142 per 100,000.63 In 1989 there were 0 cases of cholera 
per 100,000 people; by 1994 there were 1,344 per 100,000.64
                                                 
60  See, for example, David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice 244–60 (Kluwer 2001); Scott I. 
Bortz, Avoiding a Collision of Competence: The Relationship between the Security Council and the International 
Court of Justice in Light of Libya vs. United States, 2 Fla St U J Transnatl L & Poly 353, 370 (1993); 
Thomas M. Franck, Comment, The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of the UN 
Legality?, 86 Am J Intl L 519, 522 (1992); Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International 
Court, and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 Eur J Intl L 517, 518–19 (1999). 
 In March 1991, an 
envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General reported that the situation was 
61  Security Council Res No 666, UN Doc S/RES/661, ¶¶ 3–4 (1990). 
62  Id at ¶ 4. This at least was the public language of the document, although in closed meetings the 
US and other members of the Council blocked all imports of food into Iraq for several months. 
See Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions 52–54 (Harvard 2010). 
63  World Health Organization, Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis, 
WHO/EHA 96.1, 1, 12 (1996), online at http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/5249.html (visited 
Oct 14, 2011). 
64  Id. 
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“near apocalyptic,”65 describing in detail the broad collapse of Iraq’s 
infrastructure, including water purification, sewage treatment, agricultural 
production, food supplies and distribution, and the telephone system and all 
modern means of communication. Iraq, he reported, “has, for some time to 
come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age.”66
The widespread and indiscriminate damage done by the Iraq sanctions 
brought criticisms of the Council and its use of sanctions from many sources. 
Within the United Nations, the humanitarian damage raised fundamental 
questions about the nature, and even the legitimacy, of the United Nations itself. 
In 1995 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described 
economic sanctions as a “blunt instrument” that raised ethical questions about 
the legitimacy of inflicting suffering on vulnerable groups, complicated the work 
of humanitarian agencies by imposing arduous bureaucratic requirements on 
them, and conflicted with the development objectives of the United Nations by 
doing long-term damage to the productive capacity of the country.
 With the sanctions in place, the 
humanitarian crisis continued for more than a decade. 
67 In 2000, 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintained that “the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq poses a serious moral dilemma for this 
Organization.”68 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
passed a resolution condemning the Security Council sanctions on Iraq.69 In a 
report commissioned by the Commission on Human Rights, the Belgian jurist 
Marc Bossuyt described the situation in Iraq as “extremely grave,”70 and he 
suggested that the sanctions were “unequivocally illegal under existing 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.”71
                                                 
65  UN, Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis 
Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for 
Administration and Management, UN Doc S/22366, ¶ 8 (1991).  
 Legal scholars 
repeatedly questioned whether the Security Council was exceeding the scope of 
its legitimacy in imposing such measures. Many asked whether the Council, in its 
Chapter VII interventions, should be subject to the same restraints as nations in 
66  Id. 
67  UN Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organization, UN Doc A/50/60 - S/1995/1, ¶ 70 (1995). 
68  UN SCOR, 55th Sess, 4120th mtg at 2, UN Doc S/PV.4120 (2000).  
69  UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanitarian Situation of the Iraqi 
Population, Sub-Commission on Human Rights Decision 2000/112, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2000/L.11/Add.2 (2000). 
70  Marc Bossuyt, UN Commission on Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on 
the Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, ¶ 59 (2000). 
71  Id at ¶ 71. 
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warfare, particularly the principles of discrimination and proportionality; 
whether the use of sanctions against Iraq was itself a human rights violation; 
whether the sanctions on Iraq undermined the broader credibility of the United 
Nations; and whether the effects of the sanctions created instability and harmed 
the innocent, contravening the Council’s mandate to ensure peace and security.72
3. Bosnia. 
 
In response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council 
invoked Chapter VII and passed Resolution 713, which prohibited the supply of 
arms and military equipment to all parties to the conflict.73 However, this did not 
de-escalate the conflict. On the contrary, because of the substantial imbalance in 
arms, the result was that the embargo enabled Serbia to implement a policy of 
ethnic cleansing, while the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina could not acquire 
arms to defend itself.74
                                                 
72  See, for example, Michael Cornell, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of United Nations 
Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16 Conn J Intl L 325, 346–47 (2001) 
(“Does UNSCR 687’s Broad Scope Violate the UN Charter? . . . [The issue becomes] whether 
such far-reaching provisions are necessary to achieve such peace and security.”); Marcella David, 
After-Words: At the End of the Day, 11 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 427, 428 (2001) (suggesting 
that there was neither “moral nor political authority” for the sanctions on Iraq); Andrew K. 
Fishman, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The Use of Economic Sanctions and Threats to International Peace 
and Security, 13 Emory Intl L Rev 687, 708–10 (1999) (discussing the application of jus cogens to the 
Security Council); Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 
17 Mich J Intl L 221, 293 (1996) (noting that concern about the impact of economic sanctions is 
not new but takes on new implications when associated with Security Council enforcement); 
Peggy Kozal, Note, Is the Continued Use of Sanctions As Implemented Against Iraq a Violation of 
International Human Rights?, 28 Den J Intl L & Poly 383, 391–99 (2000) (discussing customary law 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as measures of accountability for 
the Council); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 Eur J Intl L 63, 63 (2002) 
(“The impact of United Nations sanctions on Iraq has sparked a worldwide debate on all aspects 
of sanctions, including their legality.”); Rene Provost, Starvation As a Weapon: Legal Implications of the 
United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 Colum J Transnatl L 577, 618–22 (1992) 
(discussing the application of the principles of distinction and proportionality to the food 
embargo); Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious 
Legitimacy, 85 Am J Intl L 516, 523 (1991) (questioning whether Resolution 678, which implicitly 
authorized the use of force against Iraq, exceeded the legitimate scope of the Council’s authority, 
in response to inordinate pressure from the United States). 
 Although this result was not the intention of the Council, 
it nevertheless raised concerns about Chapter VII measures that go awry. 
Because these measures required the participation of all the member states 
within the United Nations, they demonstrated that a strategic misjudgment on 
the part of Council could result in a catastrophe of great magnitude. When 
Bosnia brought an action against Serbia before the ICJ, Judge Lauterpacht 
73  Security Council Res No 713, UN Doc S/RES/713 (1991).  
74  Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effect of Targeted Sanctions, in David Cortright and George A. 
Lopez, eds, Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft 171, 174 (Rowman & Littlefield 2002). 
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maintained that the Security Council had to be bound by international law, at 
least with regard to something as fundamental as the prohibition on genocide: 
“One has only to state the . . . proposition thus—that a Security Council 
resolution may even require participation in genocide—for its unacceptability to 
be apparent.”75 As with the Lockerbie case and the Iraq sanctions, legal scholars 
noted that the Council’s actions regarding Bosnia raised concerns about whether 
it is limited in its actions by international law, and if so, who would make and 
enforce such a determination.76
B. Other Concerns of Overreaching 
 
There were other occasions on which the Security Council, invoking 
Chapter VII, took unprecedented measures of questionable legitimacy. Some, 
such as the establishment of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, ultimately had broad credibility.77 But even those measures raised 
questions.78 As international law scholars have maintained for decades, Chapter 
VII gives such broad powers to the Council because the Charter envisions a 
moment of crisis, where it would not be possible to wait for the consensus of 
the broader international community before acting; the member states confer 
primary responsibility on the Council for the maintenance of international peace 
and security “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations.”79
                                                 
75  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures 
(Bos & Her v Yugo), 1993 ICJ 325, 440 (Sept 13, 1993) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht). 
 This mandate to respond quickly in the face of emergencies was the 
rationale that was given when the Charter was drafted, and it was echoed 
repeatedly in the years that followed. In light of this, creating a judicial tribunal, 
which would hear cases that could continue on for years, seems a questionable 
use of those powers. 
76  See Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Development of Limits on the Security 
Council’s Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 Emory Intl L Rev 509, 514 (1996) (suggesting 
that “the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s conclusions regarding the limits on the Security Council’s powers 
have advanced international jurisprudence on this issue by several steps”); Craig Scott, et al, A 
Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the 
United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 Mich J Intl L 1, 6 (1994) 
(discussing the concern that the arms embargo contributed to the Bosnian government’s inability 
to prevent genocide).  
77  Louise Arbour and Aryeh Neier, History and Future of the International Criminal Tribunals in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 13 Am U Intl L Rev 1495, 1496 (1998). 
78  Jared Schott, Chapter VII As Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency, 6 
Nw J Intl Hum Rts 24, 25 (2007). 
79  UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 1. 
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There were also other measures by the Council in the early 1990s that 
expanded the use of Chapter VII in unprecedented ways and that raised 
questions of overreaching. In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, the Council’s imposition of reparations was unprecedented in its history, 
as were its determination of the boundary dispute and its imposition of no-fly 
zones.80 While Article 47 of Chapter VII envisions that the Security Council 
would establish a body to oversee the use of force, the Iraq measures, as well as 
others, authorized the use of force by member states, not by the forces under 
United Nations leadership envisioned under Article 43. As the Council more 
frequently invited member states to enforce its Chapter VII measures, it ceded 
direct supervision, raising questions about the legitimacy of member states 
interpreting for themselves the scope of their authority in these cases.81 The 
expanded use of peacekeeping forces and the role of member states in enforcing 
Chapter VII measures raised questions about whether such forces were subject 
to the laws of war.82 Criticisms of the humanitarian impact of the sanctions 
imposed by the Council were also raised in the context of Haiti.83 Others 
questioned the legitimacy of Chapter VII interventions in internal conflicts;84 
whether United Nations peacekeeping forces are bound by international law; 
and the proliferation of measures involving economic sanctions.85
Thus, the concern about the Council’s overreaching and the very real 
possibility that the Council might abuse its considerable power—or had already 
done so—led many to revisit the question: What exactly are the legal limits on 
the Council, particularly in the context of Chapter VII measures? In contrast to 
the 1950s, the mid-1990s marked a dramatic shift in how this question was 
asked—insistently and with considerable anxiety—and by whom. It was no 
longer an abstract issue discussed at academic conferences that arose 
occasionally and fleetingly. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the question became an 
explicit and serious challenge to the preeminent institutions of global 
governance and a topic that was addressed repeatedly and in many variations 
within the international community and scholarly literature. 
 
                                                 
80  Schweigman, Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII at 1 (cited in note 60). 
81  Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 294 (cited in note 72). 
82  See generally Richard D. Glick, Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations 
Armed Forces, 17 Mich J Intl L 53 (1995); Robert O. Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Beyond the 
Laws of War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework, 27 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 293 (1996). 
83  O’Connell, Authorization of Force at 69 (cited in note 43). 
84  Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 Mich J Intl 
L 519, 528 (1994). 
85  Schrijver noted that as of January 1, 1994, there were eight cases of sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council. Use of Economic Sanctions at 123 (cited in note 23). 
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IV. RESPONSES TO THE COUNCIL ’S ACTIVISM 
The international legal and diplomatic community reacted in several ways. 
First, there was explicit discussion of a question that had not been viewed as a 
live issue in many decades. The concern articulated was not just that the Council 
might exceed the scope of its mandate or that the machinery of the Council 
might be subject to extraordinary control by one of the permanent members, 
but that the Council itself might violate fundamental standards of human rights 
and international humanitarian law. If the Council were, in principle, limited by 
international law, what court could judge it, and what entity would enforce those 
limits? Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked: “[W]ith the permanent members 
now largely unanimous, does the Security Council have unlimited powers? How 
far can it extend the scope of its activities? Is it up to the Council alone to 
interpret what its own powers are? Are its actions essentially unchecked?”86 José 
Alvarez noted that “[s]ome realists characterize the Charter scheme as 
constituting a ‘police state’ rather than a system based on the ‘rule of law.’”87 
Michael Reisman and Douglas Stevick proposed that the Council be subject to 
the same limitations as states during warfare, such as the principles of 
proportionality and discrimination.88 Schweigman argued that the Security 
Council could not commit a manifest abuse of rights, which “would occur when 
[its] action was manifestly disproportionate or unnecessary as regards its aim, the 
restoration of international peace.”89
                                                 
86  Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective 13 
(Kluwer 1998). See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Statement Delivered to the Congress on Public 
International Law Held at the United Nations (Mar 17, 1995), in International Law as a Language for 
Foreign Relations 593, 596 (Kluwer 1996). 
 
87  José E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 Am J Intl L 1, 2 (1996). 
88  W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards to United 
Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 Eur J Intl L 86, 96 (1998). See also Joy K. Fausey, 
Comment, Does the United Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own 
Human Rights Standards?, 10 Conn J Intl L 193, 209–213 (1994) (discussing whether economic 
sanctions violate the principle of proportionality); T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on 
the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
26 Netherlands YB Intl L 33, 68 (1995) (discussing “the question as to which legal limitations—if 
any—apply to the Council in the execution of its responsibilities as the collective security organ of 
the United Nations”); Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 307–309 (cited in note 72).  
89  Schweigman, Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII at 177 (cited in note 60). Thomas 
Franck and José Alvarez propose similar standards of “gross abuse of discretion” and “test of 
manifest irregularity.” Id at 177 n 784, citing Thomas M. Franck, The United Nations as Guarantor of 
International Peace and Security: Past, Present and Future, in Christian Tomuschat, ed, The United Nations 
at Fifty: A Legal Perspective 25, 37 (Kluwer 1995), and citing Alvarez, 90 Am J Intl L at 26 (cited in 
note 87). 
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Within the international community, there was also a multifaceted initiative 
toward Security Council reform. Except for the expansion of the elected 
members in 1965 from six seats to ten seats,90 there had been little interest in any 
institutional changes in the Council for decades. The sense that the Security 
Council had abused the enormous power at its disposal, and the fear that it 
could do so again, triggered a series of initiatives toward Security Council 
reform, specifically challenging the adequacy of the representation on the 
Council and the special powers of the permanent members. In June 1992, 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, envisioned a number of 
ways that the Council could be more effective.91 Later that year, there was a 
summit meeting of the nonaligned movement, at which there was broad 
international support for proposals to reform the structure of membership 
within the Council. At the General Assembly session in November 1992, there 
were further calls for Security Council reform, and in December, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution to consider the question of equitable 
representation, and an increase in membership, of the Council.92 The following 
year, the General Assembly created an “Open-Ended Working Group to 
consider all aspects of the question of an increase in membership . . . and other 
matters related to the Security Council.”93 In 1995, the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution that “[t]he Security Council should . . . be expanded and its 
working methods continue to be reviewed to enhance its representative 
character and improve its . . . transparency.”94
Within the Working Group and the General Assembly, the permanent 
members consistently objected to the proposed changes. Still, the calls for 
reform, from many sources, continued. The United Nations Millennium 
Declaration of 2000 stated that member states would intensify their efforts “to 
achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects.”
 
95
                                                 
90  UN Charter Art 23. 
 In 
2003, Secretary-General Annan initiated an effort to revisit the idea of Security 
Council reform, appointing a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change to consider new approaches to threats to peace and security, including 
91 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN 
Doc A/47/277 - S/24111 (1992). 
92  General Assembly Res No 47/62, UN Doc A/RES/47/62 (1992). 
93  General Assembly Res No 48/26, UN Doc A/RES/48/26 (1993).  
94  General Assembly Res No 49/499, UN Doc A/RES/49/499 (1995). 
95  United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Res No 55/2, UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2, ¶ 30 (2000). 
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Security Council reform. In 2005, he proposed changes in representation to 
provide a place for underrepresented regions.96
The legitimacy of the institutional structure of the Council came under fire 
in legal scholarship as well. In 1993, for example, David Caron commented on 
the impunity of the permanent members, noting that the veto means “that 
certain members of the [international] community potentially are not 
governed.”
 
97 Erskine Childers argued that “[n]o longer is it morally possible for 
democratic peoples to accept that 5 out of 165 member governments can have 
such deadly power in the name of a peace-dedicated world organization.”98 In 
1994, Sean Murphy, while defending the legitimacy of the Council, conceded 
that “the perception that Security Council decisions lack legitimacy resonates 
because it is not clear why some states should count more than others.”99 Where 
the efforts at Security Council reform addressed in abstract terms the issues of 
representation and voting, some scholars explicitly raised the issue of the 
influence of the US within the Council, calling it a “Faustian bargain,” or 
examined the problematic impact of US unilateralism on the Council and the 
United Nations in general.100
A second response to Security Council activism, found in both legal 
scholarship and judicial rulings, entailed revisiting the question of whether there 
could be judicial review that would provide some degree of oversight over the 
Council. José Alvarez asked: 
 
Should the International Court of Justice (ICJ) “judicially review” Security 
Council decisions? The question, once fanciful, is now being asked seriously 
by litigants in and judges on the World Court, nonpermanent members of 
the Security Council that consider it an “undemocratic” body acting as “a 
                                                 
96  UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, UN 
Doc A/59/2005 (2005). 
97  David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 Am J Intl L 552, 
565 (1993). 
98  Erskine Childers, Gulf Crisis Lessons for the United Nations, 23 Bull of Peace Props 129, 133 (1992). 
99  Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 
32 Colum J Transnatl L 201, 252 (1994). 
100  See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, in David M. 
Malone, ed, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 253, 257 (Lynne Rienner 
2004); David M. Malone, A Decade of US Unilateralism?, in David M. Malone and Yuen Foong 
Khong, eds, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspectives 19, 20 (Lynne Rienner 2003); 
Frederick Rawski and Nathan Miller, The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian Bargain?, in 
David M. Malone, ed, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 357, 357 (“The 
Council has been forced to cater to U.S. interests, thereby undercutting its achievements and 
undermining its legitimacy in an effort to remain relevant.”).  
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cloak for a new form of imperialism,” and scholars worried about its recent 
“quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” acts.101
Writing in 1994, Mohammed Bedjaoui observed that in 1952, when the 
Institut de Droit International considered whether there should be judicial 
remedy for improper decisions by international political organs, the concern was 
dismissed as premature. But, Bedjaoui notes: 
 
Now that half a century has elapsed, it is no longer “premature” to raise the 
problem of controlling legality once again. Far from exonerating the United 
Nations from all surveillance, the weight of the responsibilities entrusted to 
it, which is now even greater than in 1952, cries out for the installation of 
checks and balances, including a reasonable and balanced mechanism for 
checking the legality of its acts.102
A. Judicial and Scholarly Responses 
 
It was in this context that scholars and jurists revisited the question of 
whether the Security Council is bound by international human rights law when 
exercising its mandate under Chapter VII, or whether the Chapter VII powers 
override principles of human rights.103
1. The 1990s: revisiting the question. 
 
The first generation of responses, primarily in the early and mid-1990s, 
were diametrically opposed to the position of Kelsen and Dulles: of course the 
Council is bound by international law—it is unthinkable that the Council could 
legally commit an atrocity in the name of restoring peace. These responses were 
widespread and emphatic, and they incorporated several different arguments. 
The central argument relied on Article 24. Judge Weeramantry in his 
dissent in Lockerbie noted that Article 24(1) provides that the Council “‘shall act 
in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’ The duty 
is imperative and the limits are categorically stated.”104
                                                 
101  Alvarez, 90 Am J Intl L at 1 (cited in note 
 Judge Lauterpacht in the 
Bosnian Genocide case reasoned: “Nor should one overlook the significance of the 
provision in Article 24(2) of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to 
maintain international peace and security, the Security Council shall act in accord 
87). See also Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 310–11 
(cited in note 11) (discussing whether judicial review is a viable means of achieving accountability 
for the Council); Karl Doehring, Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences, 
1 Max Planck YB UN L 91, 93 (1997); Gill, 26 Neth YB Intl L at 113 (cited in note 88); Geoffrey 
R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 Harv Intl L J 1, 3 (1993). 
102  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 59 (cited in note 12). 
103  See, for example, Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 312 (cited in note 72); Anna M. Vradenburgh, 
Comment, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Charter: Do They ‘Trump’ Human Rights Law?, 
14 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J 175, 189–92 (1991). 
104  Lockerbie, 1992 ICJ at 171 (Weeramantry dissenting). 
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with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”105 Many others echoed 
this view, invoking an array of arguments.106 The Bossuyt Report, commissioned 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights to examine the Security Council’s use 
of economic sanctions, maintained that because Article 24 requires the Council 
to act in accordance with the principles and purposes contained in Article 1, it 
follows that “no act of the Security Council is exempt from scrutiny as to 
whether or not that act is in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.”107
In addition to the limitations implied by the Charter, the Bossuyt Report 
maintained that the Security Council’s right to economic sanctions cannot “in 




 Judith Gardam argued that “there appears to be no justification 
for the view that the Security Council is at liberty to completely disregard the 
purposes and principles of the Charter, and even less for the denial that it 
operates to a certain extent within the general system of international law.”109 
Some looked to the intent of those who drafted the Charter, as did Judge 
Weeramantry in his dissent in Lockerbie.110 Others, such as Doehring, argued that 
the United Nations and the Security Council were subjects of international law, 
even if they were not states, since every subject of international law is bound by 
international law; therefore, they may violate international law.111
If it is the case that the Security Council cannot require States to breach 
fundamental humanitarian values in the sanction regimes it imposes on 
States, it is surely anomalous to regard it as able to do so itself. It is 
inconceivable that with the current emphasis on human rights and 
humanitarian principles, the Security Council can be regarded as operating 
 Some argued 
that since the Security Council was an entity comprised of states, it could not 
have a mandate that conflicted with the legal limits upon states: 
                                                 
105  Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 440 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht). 
106  See Schweigman, Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII at 168 (cited in note 60). For 
example, Suy says that “[t]he Council is bound by the Purposes and Principles of the 
Organization and discharges its duties on the basis of the specific powers granted by the Charter”; 
Gowlland-Debbas holds that “[t]he substantive limits are to be found in Article 24(2), according 
to which the Council is bound to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations”; and Fassbender maintains that “[t]he values and goals set out by the Charter in 
its preamble and first two articles are . . . standards of legality (or constitutionality) for legal acts 
passed by UN organs.” Id. 
107  Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions at ¶ 23 (cited in note 70). 
108  Id at ¶ 24. 
109  Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 303 (cited in note 72). 
110  See text accompanying note 59. 
111  Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 92 (cited in note 101). 
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outside the constraints on the conduct of armed conflict that have been 
painstakingly developed over the years by States.112
Judge Lauterpacht in the Bosnia case considered the possibility that 
Resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on all the belligerents, “can be seen 
as having in effect called on Members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly 
and assuredly unwillingly, to become in some degree supporters of the genocidal 
activity . . . and in this manner and to that extent to act contrary to a rule of jus 
cogens.”
 
113 He maintained that it follows that when this resolution “began to make 
members of the United Nations accessories to genocide, it ceased to be valid 
and binding . . . and that members of the United Nations then became free to 
disregard it.”114
Where Kelsen maintained a distinction between international law and 
restoration of peace, Bedjaoui reasoned that these cannot be separated. He 
rejected Kelsen’s argument that the Security Council need not take account of 
principles of justice and international law. He argued that “Hans Kelsen’s 
analysis is not acceptable,” asserting that “all the principal organs of the United 
Nations must respect not only the Charter but international law itself.”
 
115 Some 
commentators simply appealed to moral intuition and seemed to be struggling 
for adequate language to capture the absurdity and wrongfulness of the 
possibility that an institution established for governance and peaceful order 
could itself profoundly undermine those purposes—“this machinery cannot be 
meant to perform unlawfulness.”116 In the end they reasoned that the notion of 
exempting the Council from international humanitarian law was inconceivable, 
unacceptable, and untenable; that the truth of this is so obvious it is incapable of 
demonstration; or that “it is undisputed,” even though the matter was clearly 
very much in dispute.117
                                                 
112  Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 319 (cited in note 
 
72). Gill notes that: 
[h]umanitarian law . . . forms part of the core values and principles of the 
Organization . . . . In founding the UN as primary repository of collective 
security, the Member States could not, in transferring or conferring the power 
to wage war and conduct military operations as an instrument of international 
policy, invest the Organization with the power to maintain and restore 
international peace and security by means which would violate these 
fundamental precepts. The Member States could not attribute to the 
Organization a power which they themselves did not and do not possess. 
  Gill, 26 Neth YB Intl L at 82 (cited in note 88). 
113  Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht). See also Akande, 46 Intl & 
Comp L Q at 322 (cited in note 11). 
114  Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht). 
115  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 32 (cited in note 12). 
116  Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 100 (cited in note 101). 
117  See, for example, Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht) (“One has 
only to state the proposition thus—that a Security Council resolution may even require 
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However, there was a second generation of responses to the question of 
whether the Council must itself abide by international human rights law. They 
echoed the position held by Kelsen and Dulles, suggesting that the Council can 
legally override any such principles, but with a radically different tone. Where 
Kelsen and Dulles saw this as simply a matter of the Council’s entitlement and 
blithely dismissed objections, those jurists and scholars who were now 
suggesting that there may in fact be no limits on the Council conveyed a sense of 
anguish. In articles with titles like Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The Security Council is 
Unbound by Law,118
Many of the arguments revisit exactly the concerns addressed in 1948 by 
critics of the Charter, who had maintained that the Charter’s language permitted 
precisely this interpretation. Of particular concern, as some noted, is Article 103, 
which holds that obligations under the Charter override any treaty obligations, 
that arguably might include the Convention against Genocide, the Geneva 
Conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights. The supremacy clause “threatens to render the 
Council’s subjection to international law partially void.”
 there is a common theme: it may in fact be that the Charter 
and international law are inadequate to control the Council under Chapter VII—
and God help us if this is so. 
119
                                                                                                                              
participation in genocide—for its unacceptability to be apparent.”); Bedjaoui, New World Order at 7 
(cited in note 
 Some suggested that 
Article 103 would vitiate customary law as well. Since it provides that Charter 
obligations override member states’ “obligations under any other international 
agreement,” it follows that “[i]n a literal sense, Article 103 would render 
inoperable not only treaties, but also state obligations under customary 
12) (“It appears less acceptable than ever that sovereign States should have created 
an international organization equipped with broad powers of control . . . but itself exempted from 
the duty to respect both the Charter which gave it birth and international law.”); id at 120 (“To 
place the Security Council above international law would scarcely be a legally sustainable 
proposition, like a Euclidean theorem incapable of demonstration.”); Manusama, United Nations 
Security Council at 31 (cited in note 29) (“It is undisputed that principles of humanity must be 
applied to each instance in which force is used, irrespective of whom or what is involved.”); 
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial 
Function, in A.S. Muller, et al, eds, The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years 219, 
230 (Martinus Nijhoff 1997) (“One cannot easily envisage it being acceptable that the Council 
should by decision consciously breach the norms of the law of armed conflict.”); Akande, 46 Intl 
& Comp L Q at 314 (cited in note 11) (“It is almost inconceivable for there to be no legal limits 
to the power of the Security Council . . . .”); Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 93 (cited in 
note 101) (discussing “the assumption that the Security Council alone determines its rights” and 
concluding that “this position is, of course, not tenable”). 
118  Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The Security Council is Unbound by Law, 12 Leiden 
J Intl L 549 (1999). 
119  Manusama, United Nations Security Council at 22 (cited in note 29). 
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international law, as such obligations are theoretically based on some sort of 
agreement.”120
Some argued that Article 25 imposes obligations on states to implement 
Council resolutions, without recognizing any circumstances in which they can 
question or decline to follow the Council’s decision, because Article 25 provides 
that United Nations members “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
 
121 Gabriël Oosthuizen 
submits that this arguably implies that the Council must act in accord with the 
Charter but not necessarily with international law.122
Several commentators have suggested that the deliberate intent of the 
drafters was to exempt the Council from any limits or control. Bedjaoui says: 
 
[I]t is not unreasonable to ask [whether the drafters meant to exempt the 
Security Council from any limits] when, on the one hand, the founders of 
the Charter deliberately refrained from including any specific legality-test 
clause and, on the other hand, the absence of such a clause not only fails to 
offer protection against any action in excess of Charter powers but is even 
conducive to it. This has been clearly demonstrated in practice.123
August Reinisch observes that “[t]he most prominent theory, which ‘liberates’ 
the Security Council from any legal constraints, is based on the argument that 
the Council, as the main ‘executive’ organ of the United Nations, was 
deliberately exempted from legal limits when fulfilling its major task of securing 
world peace and security.”
 
124
Anna Vradenburgh argues that the drafters’ intent was evident in the 




Others pointed out the disparity contained in Article 1(1). The clause “in 
conformity with principles of justice and international law” refers only to 
 This is true of Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 provides that the 
Council can impose measures not involving the use of force and that these may 
include economic, diplomatic, or other measures, without stating any exclusions 
or conditions. Article 42, concerning measures involving the use of force, 
likewise provides that “[s]uch action may include” operations by air, sea, or land 
forces. Neither Article 41 nor 42 provides for any exclusions or conditions. 
                                                 
120  Id at 22–23. 
121  Boris Kondoch, The Limits of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of Iraq, in Michael 
Bothe and Boris Kondoch, eds, 7 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace 
Operations 267, 282 (Kluwer 2002), quoting UN Charter Art 24. 
122  Oosthuizen, 12 Leiden J Intl L at 555–56 (cited in note 118). 
123  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 9 (cited in note 12). 
124  August Reinisch, Note, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security 
Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 Am J Intl L 851, 855 (2001). 
125  Vradenburgh, 14 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J at 175 (cited in note 103). 
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settlements of disputes “by peaceful means.”126 No such provision is found in 
the clause pertaining to the use of force, which authorizes the United Nations 
“to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace.”127 There was also another argument made in regard to Article 1(1): 
that the reference to purposes and principles does not serve as a substantive 
limitation on the Council’s powers. Gardam suggested there could be an 
interpretation holding that the purposes and principles are “merely words of 
exhortation.” She notes that if this were the case, it would allow “for dangerous 
leeways of choice to an unrepresentative body necessarily swayed by 
considerations that may be antithetical to the ideals of the Charter.”128 In 
addition, Gardam suggests, in light of the fairly vague language of the principles 
and purposes, “it is possible to infer from Article 1(1) that if the Charter had 
intended otherwise to restrict the Security Council in any way,” it would have 
done so explicitly.129
Oosthuizen suggested that an argument might be made that Article 2(7), 
which concerns the principle of non-intervention in domestic matters, could also 
be read as supporting the interpretation that the Security Council is not limited 
by international law because it provides that “[n]othing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
  
130
[T]he idea that the Security Council creates and imposes its own law raises 
[the question of] whether the Security Council, when operating in 
“lawmaker mode”, is exempted from the requirement to respect, on the one 
hand, the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, on the other, the 
rules and principles of international law.
 Bedjaoui suggested that 
the Council could be understood to function as a legislative body, and if so, then 
there was no provision for overturning or questioning it in this mode: 
131
Dapo Akande and others noted that, in any event, in the absence of judicial 
review, no venue has jurisdiction to make a determination as to the legality of a 
direct and enforceable Security Council measure.
 
132
                                                 
126  UN Charter Art 1(1). 
 The ICJ, at best, could 
127  Id. See also Oosthuizen, 12 Leiden J Intl L at 552 (cited in note 118); O’Connell, Authorization of 
Force at 57 (cited in note 43). 
128  Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 321 (cited in note 72). 
129  Id at 297–98. 
130  Oosthuizen, 12 Leiden J Intl L at 553 (cited in note 118), quoting UN Charter Art 2, ¶ 7. 
131  Bedjaoui, New World Order at 1 (cited in note 12). 
132  Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 311 (cited in note 11). 
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“engage in an ‘expressive’ mode of review by casting doubt on the acceptability 
or legality of Council action, thus ‘cueing’ the Council to exercise care in the 
future, though not actually voiding the Council decision.”133
Ultimately, then, there are no international legal limits to the [Security 
Council (SC)]’s Chapter VII enforcement powers. For example, it is 
conceivable that the SC might not honour a people’s right to self-
determination since it could constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. 
It is conceivable that the SC might ignore the violation, by its own or 
mandated forces who are attempting to reimpose international peace and 
security in a strategically vital part of the globe, of the fundamental human 
rights of those responsible for its serious destabilisation. It is conceivable 
that the SC might turn a blind eye to the actual non-compliance with the 
Geneva Conventions in a long drawn-out struggle against a pernicious 
aggressor. It is conceivable that the SC might underwrite an illegal 
secessionist claim because it will ensure regional peace. It is conceivable that 
the SC might block weapons supply to a people fighting against genocide. It 
is conceivable that the SC might impose sanctions that violate international 
human rights and humanitarian law. . . . The [United Nations Charter]’s 
drafters clearly intended the SC to be left with absolute powers of 
appreciation in maintaining international peace and security. The SC’s 
powers are nowhere curtailed by an implicit or explicit reference to 
international law.
 Implicitly referring 
to the Security Council “activism” from the early 1990s, Oosthuizen concludes: 
134
2. The late 1990s through the present. 
 
By the late 1990s, many things had changed. The political balance of the 
Council shifted, and there was far more resistance to the will of the US. This was 
perhaps most apparent in 2003, when the Council refused to authorize the 
invasion of Iraq, despite considerable pressure on the part of the US. The 
Council continued to employ Chapter VII measures actively, but there was no 
longer the possibility of consensus for the sort of broad or extreme measures 
that were seen in the early 1990s. Instead, as with the sanctions imposed on Iran 
in 2009 and 2010, the resolutions often resulted from compromises, imposing 
measures that were not as harsh or as broad as the US sought. 
In addition to the resistance within the Council, the Secretary-General and 
General Assembly were increasingly vocal in identifying the points of conflict 
between the Council’s Chapter VII measures and international law, and they 
called for greater accountability. In 1998, the Secretary-General, in his annual 
report to the General Assembly, stated that “[t]he international community 
should be under no illusion: these humanitarian and human rights policy goals 
                                                 
133  Id. 
134  Oosthuizen, 12 Leiden J Intl L at 562–63 (cited in note 118). 
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cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime.”135 The following 
year, the Secretary-General stated that “[t]he fundamental principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law,” including the treatment of noncombatants, the 
prohibition on the use of chemical and biological weapons, the prohibition of 
anti-personnel mines, the destruction of places of worship and cultural 
institutions, and so forth, would be applicable to United Nations forces “in 
enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is 
permitted in self-defence.”136 In 2005, the report of the Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change called on the Council “to 
improve transparency and accountability.”137 The report also held that the 
Security Council “should always address” several basic “criteria of legitimacy” 
drawn from international humanitarian law: seriousness of threat, proper 
purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences.138
B. The Question of Judicial Review 
 
In addition, there was growing judicial recognition of limitations on the 
Security Council, in multiple venues. While there is no procedure to appeal a 
resolution passed by the Council directly to a judicial body with the machinery to 
enforce a decision against the Council, the ICJ may speak to the validity of a 
Security Council resolution in certain circumstances. It can do so in an advisory 
opinion sought by the General Assembly, UN agencies within the scope of their 
work, or the Council itself.139 It can also comment upon the validity of 
resolutions in contentious cases between states where a Security Council 
resolution is pertinent, as was the situation with the Lockerbie case.140 Writing in 
the late 1990s, Akande commented that “[t]he Court may not have the ultimate 
authority to interpret the Charter but it certainly has authority to do so.”141
                                                 
135  UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc 
A/53/1, ¶ 64 (1998).  
 Even 
without machinery to enforce its finding, Akande maintained that an ICJ 
decision “to the effect that a certain Security Council resolution is invalid or 
136  UN Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: Secretary 
General’s Bulletin, UN Doc ST/SGB/1999/13, ¶ 1.1 (1999). 
137  Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc A/59/565, ¶ 258 (2004). 
138  Id at Annex I, ¶ 56. 
139  UN Charter Art 96. 
140  Libya v US AIP, § II.i (cited in note 50). 
141  Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 342–43 (cited in note 11). 
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beyond its powers would undermine the legitimacy of that decision and weaken 
its claim to compliance.”142
In 2001, John Dugard suggested that “the total rejection of judicial review 
. . . is unlikely to prevail” and that there were several arguments for some form 
of judicial review that had growing momentum: the Charter does not explicitly 
exclude the competence of the ICJ, as it does with the General Assembly in 
Article 12; the preparatory documents were ambiguous on the point; and there 
were the limits contained in Articles 1 and 24, requiring the Council to abide by 
the principles and purposes of the United Nations.
 
143
Within judicial venues themselves, there has been a growing recognition 
that the Council is bound by international law, as well as a willingness to make a 
finding of whether or not the Council has acted in conformity with international 
law. In the early 1990s, in the Lockerbie and Bosnian Genocide cases, individual 
judges raised these concerns in dissents or in separate opinions. But in 1995, in 
the Tadi? case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, it was the court that stated in a ruling on jurisdiction: 
 
The Security Council is . . . subjected to certain constitutional limitations, 
however broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers 
cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the 
Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those 
which may derive from the internal division of power within the 
Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter 
conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).144
But by far the most significant development in this regard is a line of cases 
concerning the due process rights of those whose assets were frozen pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1267 and the successor resolutions. These 
resolutions designate persons, companies, and foundations whose assets are to 
be frozen on the basis of putative ties to al Qaida, the Taliban, or Osama bin 
Laden. While some procedural protections have been added in response to 
litigation and political pressure, these lists have been deeply problematic: initially 
names were added by the Security Council committee overseeing the sanctions 
(the “1267 Committee”) without any evidence, or even any specific information, 
about the alleged ties of these individuals to al Qaida or the Taliban. For many 
years there was no opportunity for the individuals affected to see the accusations 
against them, even in summary form, much less to challenge their accuracy. 
Even after multiple reforms, there is still no impartial body to which affected 
 
                                                 
142  Id at 336. 
143  John Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ed, United Nations Sanctions and 
International Law 83, 85 (Kluwer 2001). 
144  Prosecutor v Tadi?, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-
94-1, ¶ 28 (ICTY 1995). 
The Sword of Damocles Gordon 
Winter 2012 635 
individuals can appeal, and in some cases individuals remain on the list for years 
on end, designated globally as supporters of terrorism despite being vindicated 
by extensive investigations. 
These due process issues have been raised before numerous domestic and 
international courts. In 2009, a Canadian judge commented that the 1267 regime 
was “not unlike that of Josef K. in Kafka’s The Trial, who awakens one morning, 
and for reasons never revealed to him or the reader, is arrested and prosecuted 
for an unspecified crime.”145 In the case of Sayadi v Belgium,146 the Brussels Court 
of First Instance ruled in favor of a Belgian couple whose assets were frozen on 
dubious grounds and ordered the Belgian government to submit a delisting 
request to the 1267 Committee. The government did so, but the request was 
denied.147 However, when the couple appealed to the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), the Belgian government argued that it could not be subject to the HRC’s 
jurisdiction because Belgium had no choice in implementing the Security 
Council measure—Article 25 obliges it to implement Chapter VII measures 
without allowing for exception or challenges, and Article 103 holds that, in the 
event of a conflict, a Chapter VII measure overrides a state’s other treaty 
obligations. The HRC found that it did not have jurisdiction to rule directly on 
the legality of a Security Council measure but that it could find that a state was in 
violation of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
even if the state was acting pursuant to the Security Council’s measures.148
The Kadi case, concerning the European Community’s implementation of 
the 1267 regime, has contributed significantly to this jurisprudence. Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi businessman, was added to the list of those associated 
with al Qaida shortly after the bombing of the World Trade Center in September 
2001, and his assets were frozen in October 2001. According to the summary of 
reasons justifying these measures, Kadi was a shareholder in a bank in which 
“planning sessions for an attack against a United States facility . . . may have 
taken place.”
 
149 There was no information as to the nature of the attack, the date, 
whether the meeting in fact took place, whether al Qaida was involved, and in 
what manner Kadi was allegedly involved.150
                                                 
145  Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 2009 FC 580, ¶ 53 (Can); Grant L. Willis, Security 
Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and the 1267 Ombudsperson, *19 (University of Leiden Working 
Paper 2010), online at http://works.bepress.com/grant_willis/1/ (visited Sept 25, 2011). 
 The summary of reasons also states 
146  Sayadi v Belgium, Comm No 1472/2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008). 
147  Id; Willis, Security Council Targeted Sanctions at *19 (cited in note 145). 
148  Helen Keller and Andreas Fischer, The UN Anti-Terror Sanctions Regime Under Pressure, 9 Hum Rts L 
Rev 257, 263 (2009). 
149  Kadi, Case T-85/09 at ¶ 157. 
150  Id. 
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that Kadi “owned several firms in Albania which funneled money to extremists,” 
although it does not identify the firms, the extremists, or Kadi’s ostensible role. 
The court noted that there was an extensive criminal investigation against Kadi 
in Albania, which turned up no evidence against him.151 Likewise, in the face of 
extensive criminal investigations in Turkey and Switzerland, where Kadi had the 
opportunity to refute the claims against him, he was exonerated.152
The European Community’s Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled in 2005 
that because the EU was acting pursuant to a Chapter VII measure, the EU had 
no discretion in implementing the will of the Security Council.
 
153 Consequently, 
the court reasoned, reviewing the legality of the EU’s implementation would 
indirectly constitute judicial review of the Security Council. The court found that 
it did not have this jurisdiction. The court commented that indirect judicial 
review of a Security Council resolution was possible where there were alleged 
violations of jus cogens, which is binding on all subjects of international law, 
including the United Nations. However, the CFI found that no rights within the 
parameters of jus cogens had been violated.154
Kadi appealed to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which overruled the 
CFI, finding that EU regulations, even those implementing a Security Council 
measure, must conform with European Community law, including human rights 
law developed and recognized by the EU. The ECJ found that the EU 
regulations violated fundamental rights, including the right to property, as well as 
the right to a hearing and to effective judicial review.
 
155 The most recent ruling, 
issued by the General Court of the EU156 in September 2010, found that the 
EU’s practices still did not provide an adequate review of Kadi’s claims, and the 
court again annulled the EU regulations implementing Resolution 1267.157
In addition, two recent decisions of the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) open an extraordinary possibility for judicial 
review. In 
 The 
Kadi case suggests that the courts are showing increasing willingness not only to 
comment upon the legality of Chapter VII measures, but also to issue rulings 
that effectively block implementation of the Security Council measures.  
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom,158
                                                 
151  Id. 
 a case was brought under the 
152  Id at ¶ 158. 
153 Kadi, Case T-85/09 at ¶ 158. 
154 Id.  
155 Kadi & Al Barakaat v Council & Comm, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415-05 P, 2008 ECR I-
06351. 
156  Formerly known as the Court of First Instance. 
157  Kadi, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415-05 P at ¶ 149. 
158  Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App No 55721/07, 2011 Eur Ct HR 1093 (Grand Chamber 2011). 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by 
the families of six Iraqis who had been killed by UK soldiers, during the period 
in 2003 and 2004 when Iraq was occupied by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, whose authority was recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 
1483 (2003). Rejecting the findings of the UK courts, the Grand Chamber 
awarded substantial damages to the plaintiffs. It reasoned that, in light of the 
occupation of Basrah, the UK held “some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by a sovereign government,” and consequently, it had “exercised 
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations,” giving the ECHR jurisdiction.159 
In Al-Jedda v United Kingdom,160 the applicant was an Iraqi who came to the 
UK in 1992, where he was granted asylum and citizenship. In 2004, he returned 
to Iraq, where he was arrested by US soldiers and held in a UK detention center 
on suspicion that he had conspired with Islamic terrorists to attack the coalition 
forces.161 The plaintiff argued that his detention violated Article 5(1) of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Convention), which provides that a person may be detained only in certain 
circumstances, such as lawful arrest.162 The UK government maintained that 
while Al-Jedda’s detention did not fall under one of the enumerated categories, 
the Convention did not apply because Al-Jedda’s detention had been authorized 
by Security Council Resolution 1546.163 Consequently, they argued that since 
Resolution 1546 had been adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 103 implied 
that Resolution 1546 overrode the Convention.164 The House of Lords agreed 
unanimously, finding that “Article 103 of the United Nations Charter gave 
primacy to resolutions of the Security Council, even in relation to human rights 
agreements.”165
[T]he Court must have regard to the purposes for which the United Nations 
was created. As well as the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 1 of the United Nations 
Charter, the third subparagraph provides that the United Nations was 
established to “achieve international cooperation in . . . promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Article 
 However, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR rejected this 
argument in strong terms: 
                                                 
159  Id at ¶ 149. 
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24(2) of the Charter requires the Security Council, in discharging its duties 
with respect to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, to “act in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations.” Against this background, the Court 
considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption 
that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on 
Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the 
event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the 
Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony 
with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of 
obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and 
explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend States 
to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations 
under international human rights law.166 
C. The Scholarly Literature:  An Emerging Consensus 
Thus, the ECHR rulings suggest that regional courts may find that a state is 
in violation of international human rights law while acting under color of a 
Chapter VII measure, and it may then be subject to at least civil penalties. 
As domestic and international courts have increasingly come to recognize 
legal limits on the Security Council, the scholarly literature has, for the most part, 
developed a consensus. There is now rarely anyone who suggests that the 
Council can override international humanitarian law altogether. On the contrary, 
there is general agreement that the Council is limited on a variety of grounds. 
Some maintain, in broad terms, that “[t]he Security Council is obliged to respect 
the rules of international law, i.e. the limits of its own competencies under the 
Charter of the United Nations and the rules of general international law as 
well”167 and that the Council’s mandate must be circumscribed by the broader 
commitment to international humanitarian law.168 In 2002, Mary Ellen 
O’Connell wrote that “a clear consensus is emerging among international 
lawyers that while the Security Council may have broad authority to impose 
sanctions, it must observe standards in how sanctions are imposed, even if that 
means that sanctions are less effective,”169 and that has continued to be the case. 
In 2007, Schott described a “growing unease with the UN’s ability to limit a 
Security Council increasingly wont to exercise its impressive discretion by 
reference to security concerns.”170
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For the last decade, scholars have, with consistency, dismissed the 
argument that Article 1(1) implies that international law only applies to peaceful 
settlements and not to Chapter VII measures. O’Connell, for example, maintains 
that this position “appear[s] to contradict the plain terms of Article 24(2) that ‘in 
discharging [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’”171 It is a common viewpoint 
that the principles and purposes articulated in Article 1 require that the Council 
“cannot maintain peace and security at the complete expense” of the right of 
self-determination, the promotion of human rights, the obligation to solve social 
and economic problems, the obligation to act in good faith, and so on.172
There is not complete consensus about exactly what the limits on the 
Security Council are, but in judicial rulings and among scholars, there is 
considerable agreement. Many maintain that the Security Council is bound by 
the non-derogable rights—those rights that must be respected by states even in 
times of emergency or armed conflict—that are contained in the central 
documents of human rights, such as the ICCPR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the Genocide Convention. Erika De Wet maintains that “the non-
derogable rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel and 
degrading treatment, the prohibition of slavery . . . and freedom of thought, 
religion and conscience.”
 
173 Likewise, T.D. Gill maintains that “in any event the 
Council will at a minimum be bound by the rules of human rights contained in the 
International Bill of Rights from which no derogation is permitted in time of 
emergency or armed conflict.”174 In addition to the Kadi court, others have 
maintained that the Security Council may not violate due process and the right 
to a fair trial175 or the non-derogable rights under the ICCPR.176
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should apply to any measures by the Council.177 Others frame the position more 
broadly, reasoning that the Council is obliged to abide by the principles of 
discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity.178
Numerous scholars maintain that jus cogens, the peremptory norms of 
international law, constitute an “inherent limit on any organization’s powers.”
 
179 
Akande maintains that the Security Council is bound by jus cogens and generally 
recognized norms of human rights.180 Kenneth Manusama agrees, citing the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
provides that “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”181 Manusama maintains that 
“[t]hese norms are in particular applicable to the United Nations and the 
Security Council as part of its international legal personality and international 
rights and duties.”182 De Wet argues that because the Charter is a treaty, the 
principle contained in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention applies.183 Further, it 
has been argued that jus cogens cannot be overridden by Article 103.184
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system in order to engage in slavery, apartheid or even genocide, provided that 
the requisite majority in the Security Council can be secured.”185 
Antonios Tzanakopoulos argues that Article 25 simply does not oblige 
states to carry out Chapter VII measures that are ultra vires: 
[O]nly those decisions taken in accordance with the Charter, namely intra 
vires decisions, are to be accepted and carried out. Ultra vires decisions, 
conversely, can lay no claim to binding force. States have specifically agreed 
to carry out only those decisions that are in accordance with the Charter. 
This may seem trite; it would make little sense if States agreed to be bound 
by decisions that are not in accordance with the Charter.186 
Tzanakopoulos maintains that in the face of Security Council measures that are 
illegitimate, states are justified in refusing to implement them. He cites an early 
commentator on the newly created United Nations, who notes that while there 
is no judicial organ that can review the Council’s measures, that does not mean 
that the Council has unbounded power, since the United Nations as “an 
organization whose various organs and members all have the power to interpret 
the basic constitutional instrument without definite legal effect on the other 
organs and members can hardly be viable.”187 Tzanakopoulos maintains that 
“[s]tates themselves may proceed to determine the engagement of UN 
responsibility.”188 He says that on occasion, they have done so: “Following up 
on their auto-determination of the UN’s responsibility, States have proceeded to 
react, in particular by disobeying the Council’s binding commands. In fact, 
disobedience has always been championed as the ‘last resort’ if States are faced 
with illegal Council non-forcible action under Chapter VII.”189 Indeed, in his 
view, the threat of organized disobedience is “a potent tool for inducing 
compliance of a powerful organ with international law.” This is illustrated in the 
case of the sanctions on Libya: when the Organization of African Unity refused 
to comply any longer with the Council’s sanctions on Libya, “a seven-year 
deadlock was miraculously resolved and the sanctions were suspended.”190 
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increased willingness to openly criticize what courts and scholars see as 
overreaching on the Council’s part. 
V. CONCLUSION  
In a sense, this is the oldest story in the world: How is power to be limited? 
In the seventeenth century, Filmer rejected the theory that government should 
be based on the consent of the governed. It is argued, he said, that this would 
eliminate arbitrary power, but in truth, there is no power that is not arbitrary. 
Whoever it is that rules is either the source of law, with none above him and 
none constraining him, or else he is not the ruler, because there is someone else 
who is above him. But in either case, at the top there simply is someone with 
ultimate power. Filmer argued that whether the holder of that power is a king, 
the people, or some other entity, it does not change the fact that ultimate power 
is fundamentally arbitrary.191
The question of whether the Security Council, which holds such 
extraordinary power, is itself bound by law is rooted in the fundamental 
contradictions that characterize the design of the Council. At the drafting of the 
United Nations Charter, there was on one hand an argument of emergency—
that in the face of aggression, there would be such urgency to respond that any 
restraint on the Council posed the risk of crippling it in a moment of crisis. Yet 
at the same time, Article 24 was meant to provide a sense of assurance that the 
Council would never go terribly astray. The vagueness and ambiguity of Article 1 
turned a question of interpretation into a constitutional contradiction: there is a 
clause that requires the Council to abide by international law in the context of 
peaceful settlements, so why is it absent in the clause about the use of force? Is it 
because it was so obviously applicable that there is no need to say it explicitly? 
Or is it the exact opposite—that it was deliberately excluded so that, under 
Chapter VII, the Council could literally do absolutely anything it wanted? The 
answer seems to be that the drafters, or more specifically the Great Powers who 
would become the permanent members, wanted the Council’s power to be 
unbounded, but it would not have been politically feasible to say this explicitly 
and still maintain the broad support of the international community needed for 
ratification. 
 It seems that this is at the heart of the dilemma of 
whether the Security Council is bound by law: either it holds the highest power 
globally, or it does not. 
The ambiguity of the document seems tied to a certain sleight of hand: if 
the grant of unbounded authority had been stated in such bald terms; no one 
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would have consented, other than those who would wield that authority, so at 
the beginning there were assurances that this was not really the case. These 
assurances were sufficient to stave off outright rejection from those countries 
that would never wield this power, and of course, politically, there was little 
choice in the matter anyway. But the assurances were vague, as well as lacking 
means of enforcement, so that everyone understood they would not ever 
amount to much. We see this most vividly with regard to Article 24: the solution 
to the political problem was to include Article 24, which seemed to provide 
limits on the Council, while actually neither providing any venue with 
jurisdiction to hear a complaint that the Council had abused its power nor 
establishing an entity with the power to enforce any restraints against the will of 
this Leviathan. 
Two years later, the bluntness of Kelsen and Dulles is striking. How many 
nations would have signed on to the United Nations if it were made explicit that 
in restoring peace, the Security Council was not bound by law? With the ink dry 
on the document, it seems that there was no longer any need to pretend that the 
permanent members considered themselves to be anything other than 
unbounded in their powers. But in the context of the broader paralysis of the 
Security Council throughout the Cold War, the issue remained dormant for forty 
years. It was not until the balance of power shifted so starkly in favor of one of 
the permanent members that the theoretical possibility of the Council’s 
overreaching in profound and disturbing ways became a reality. 
At this juncture, it seems as though the matter is largely resolved. The 
political tenor of the Council has shifted, with the balance of power restored in 
some degree, such that neither the US nor any other permanent member could 
see its will implemented in the Council without opposition, as was the case in 
1990 and was largely true until 1993. The refusal of the Council to authorize the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a decisive marker in this regard. The negotiations 
and compromises that characterize recent Chapter VII measures suggest that, 
while there is not opposition of the degree that characterized the Cold War, 
neither is there complete compliance with the will of the US or any of the other 
permanent members. Consequently, the political balance now is such that the 
Council no longer seems susceptible to the kind of unilateralism and 
overreaching that took place in the early 1990s. 
There are also now voices from venues that were silent or less potent in 
the early 1990s. Within the institutions of international law, while there is no 
direct judicial review of the Council’s resolutions, there has been a growing 
willingness among international and domestic courts to comment upon the 
legality of the Council’s actions and to intervene in the implementation of these 
measures when they are seen to violate fundamental principles of human or civil 
rights. There were few within the international courts who spoke to such 
questions in the early 1990s, and those who did were not writing for the court 
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but rather in dissents or in separate opinions. There have also been challenges 
from the international community, both implicit and explicit, to the Security 
Council’s overreaching in other venues. The multiple calls for Security Council 
reform, documents such as the report from the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, and expressions of concern and disagreement from the 
Secretary-General and the General Assembly, all suggest that there would be 
vocal opposition and some amount of political resistance in the event that the 
Council were to pursue measures as extreme or controversial as was the case in 
the early 1990s. Finally, within legal scholarship, the issue seems to be settled: 
the clear consensus is that international human rights law does indeed impose 
limits on the Security Council. There is not full consensus on what those limits 
are, but there is broad agreement that they are the principles of jus cogens and that 
jus cogens at least includes prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture.  
Filmer might have something to say about this as well. In his critique of 
limited monarchy, he argues that there can be no meaningful constitutional 
limitations on a monarch. In the end, he says, it all comes down to the question 
of who will judge if the king has violated the limits: if the people judge, then it is 
not a monarchy; if the monarch judges for himself, then there are no limits.192 
Similarly, Filmer says that neither principles of conscience nor natural law—of 
which jus cogens is a variety—can serve as a limit. Natural law and principles of 
conscience are in themselves mute. The question is: Who will articulate them?193
Steven Ratner, referring to “the concern that the Council might act either 
beyond its powers under the Charter or in violation of other norms of 
international law,” wrote that “[t]his fear reached its zenith in the heady days 
after the Cold War when the Council seemed forever unified; today that era 
seems but a distant memory.”
 
If it is the monarch himself who articulates the limits on his own power, there 
will be no limits; if it is the people, then the monarchy is fundamentally 
impotent. We cannot avoid this truth: a body that articulates its own limits is a 
body that has no limits. 
194
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 It seems that Ratner is right. The fear of abuse 
of power by the Security Council has been put to rest on several levels. 
Politically, a balance of power has been restored to some degree. Legally, it 
seems the matter is resolved; the courts and legal scholarship now consistently 
recognize that there are limits and largely agree on what those are. But 
constitutionally, the matter is not resolved at all. The kind of overreaching that 
took place in the early 1990s could occur again. If there were another juncture at 
which one of the permanent members exercised the degree of political and 
193  Id at 41–42. 
194  Ratner, Security Council and International Law at 603 (cited in note 44). 
The Sword of Damocles Gordon 
Winter 2012 645 
economic influence that characterized the US in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the political restraints would evaporate; andthere is no 
mechanism for direct, enforceable judicial review. Thus, there will again be the 
possibility that the machinery of global governance can be mobilized to 
implement the agenda of a single nation, however extreme, absurd, or inhumane 
that agenda may be. 
